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In October 2001, the state governors sent a letter to the
U.S. Senate concerning the Senate’s proposed stimu-
lus package. The governors sought to prevent the pas-
sage of a package that would be detrimental to already
weak state budgets and to ask for specific assistance
from the federal government for state budget items.
As a result of the connection between federal and state
revenues and spending, state leaders often comment
on federal changes. What is remarkable about this let-
ter is that only seven months after the end of the great-
est post-war economic boom, the states were already
seeking fiscal help from the federal government. In
addition to its concerns about mounting defense and
intelligence obligations and the flailing macroecono-
my, the government now faced the specter of service
shutdowns by bankrupt state governments.
The crisis facing the state governments emerged
quickly. In August 2000, commentators at the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) were boast-
ing that states were “in their best financial conditions
in decades” (NCSL, 2000). In January 2001, the NCSL
asserted that the states remained in “excellent fiscal
condition” (NCSL, 2001c). But by August 2001, the
NCSL was detailing how states were coping with bud-
getary shortfalls (NCSL, 2001a).
In this article, I ask how the states found themselves
in fiscal trouble so quickly. I begin by discussing the
excellent revenue news from the states throughout the
economic expansion. Tax revenues increased, welfare
reform kept block grants at high levels, and the tobac-
co settlement provided a generous new form of funds.
As a result, states faced the pleasant dilemma of what
to do with their windfall revenues.
I investigate the ways states decided to use these
revenues. They faced four fundamental choices: they
could spend the money on high-priority programs; they
could return the money to taxpayers in the form of
rebates and reductions; they could reduce indebtedness;
or they could save the money for a less brilliant fu-
ture. All states chose a combination of these four.
States increased spending. Much of the spending
increase was due to mounting expenditure pressures
in health-care related areas. States also aggressively cut
taxes, particularly personal income taxes, throughout
the expansion. While the states did not move to reduce
indebtedness, they did increase their savings. States
save money by maintaining balances in their reserve
funds. Most states have created budget stabilization
or “rainy day” funds as a way to cope with unexpected
shortfalls. (The only states without such funds as of
October 2001 were Arkansas, Montana, and Oregon).
Money transferred into these funds can be withdrawn
under specific circumstances. States also maintain re-
serve balances in their general fund accounts. During
the expansion, balance increases in these accounts
were substantial but were insufficient to offset even
a mild downturn.
When state revenues began to deteriorate in the
third quarter of 2000 as the first signs of the pending
recession surfaced, state budgets soon ran into deficit.
Because nearly all states are required to pass balanced
budgets and are limited in their ability to issue debt,
they needed to deal with the budget imbalance quick-
ly. State debt limits restrict states’ ability to borrow if
changes in economic circumstances lead to shortfalls
during the fiscal year (National Association of State
Budget Officers [NASBO], 2002).1
Now, instead of the four pleasant choices outlined
earlier, states faced four difficult options to deal with
these revenue shortfalls. Because of the restrictions3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
on debt, debt issuance was not one of the options. States
could increase taxes; they could cut spending; they
could reduce the balances available in their reserve
funds; or they could rely on the federal government to
bail them out. Few states have chosen to increase taxes.
Tax increases are both politically very unpopular and
slow and difficult to shepherd through legislatures. Most
states have used a combination of spending cuts and
reserve fund withdrawals to bring their budgets into
balance. While the states have asked the federal gov-
ernment for assistance, federal aid has not been par-
ticularly forthcoming.
The current fiscal crisis highlights the problems
inherent in the states’ balanced budget system. States
cut taxes and increase expenditure during booms only
to be faced with revenue shortfalls during recessions.
Then, the states have to cut spending just when the need
for government services becomes most pronounced
and must raise taxes when taxpayers are at their poor-
est. To prepare for future downturns, state governments
should consider some policy changes. First, states
should control spending during both expansions and
recessions in order to avoid the need for dramatic cuts
during difficult times. Second, states should restruc-
ture their rainy day funds, so that they can draw on
these more heavily to maintain services during diffi-
cult times. In order to do this, reserve fund balances
would need to grow much larger than they did in the
recent expansion.
I highlight the experience of the five states that
make up the Federal Reserve’s Seventh District—
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This
allows me to paint a more precise picture than would
come from only generalizing across 50 states. These
midwestern states are interesting because they were
among the first to be harmed by the economic slow-
down. As a result, they were forced to make difficult
decisions earlier than other states. At the same time,
the behavior of the midwestern states has been fairly
typical of that of states nationwide.
The boom: Revenues
The U.S. Census Bureau segregates state funds into
four separate categories—the general fund, insurance
trust funds, utility funds, and funds for state-operated
liquor stores. In this article, I focus on the general fund
as it is the source of revenues and expenditures over
which the state has the most control and it supports
the largest state government expenditures. The other
funds are very small, with the exception of the insur-
ance trust fund. This fund supports unemployment
insurance, workers’ compensation, and programs for
state government employees.2
States generate revenues from a variety of sources,
the two most important being taxes and the federal
government. In 1999, the federal government provid-
ed just over 25 percent of general fund revenues while
taxes provided 55 percent. In 1999, most state taxes
came from general and selective sales taxes (48 per-
cent), personal income taxes (35 percent) and corpo-
rate income taxes (6 percent).
Over time, general state revenues have been in-
creasing along with the rise in national income. Be-
tween 1980 and 1992 (the first year of positive economic
growth during the recent expansion), real general rev-
enues increased by an average of 4 percent per year
in total and 3 percent per year per capita. Throughout
the recent expansion, strong national economic con-
ditions translated into continued strong state revenue
performance. Between 1992 and 1999, state revenues
grew an average of 4 percent per year and 3 percent
per capita, despite significant enacted tax reductions
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, 1981 and 2002a).3
The reason for the continued revenue growth was
that everything was going right. Robust consumer
spending translated into high sales tax revenues. Sales
tax revenues are procyclical both because spending is
itself procyclical and because states exempt the least
cyclically sensitive products from taxes—in particu-
lar, food and drugs. Between 1992 and 2000, real to-
tal state general sales tax revenues increased by 40
percent, or by an average of 4.2 percent per year. Rev-
enues from the even more procyclical personal income
tax also increased dramatically during the expansion,
by 59 percent in real terms between 1992 and 2000,
or by 6 percent per year (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, 2002b). One reason for
the increase in income tax revenues was the high lev-
el of employment and earnings. But likely even more
important was the dramatic increase in revenue from
taxes on capital gains and dividends.
The exact role of the growth of capital gains and
dividends in boosting the revenue performance of the
states is difficult to ascertain because data on income
tax revenues from different sources are not available
for most states.4 However, two sources point to a sig-
nificant increase in revenues derived from capital gains
taxes. First, state capital gains taxes are closely linked
to the federal capital gains tax and readily available
data on capital gains and dividends declared on fed-
eral individual income tax returns show a dramatic
hike over the 1990s, especially post 1994. The growth
in capital gains and dividends reported on federal in-
come tax returns is pictured in figure 1. Second, we
do have separate data on state personal income tax4 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 1
Income from dividends and capital gains
reported on federal returns
billion of 1999 dollars
withholding, estimated payments, and final settlements
paid when taxes are filed. Trends in estimated payments
give some indication of the level of capital gains and
dividends received, because these are taxes paid on
non-wage income. While estimated payments are high-
ly volatile, they did increase dramatically at times
during the expansion. For example, estimated payments
for 2000 taxes made between April 2000 and Febru-
ary 2001 were 17.1 percent higher than similar pay-
ments made the previous year (Jenny and Boyd, 2001).
Again, in parallel with the experience of the federal
government, the states’ personal income tax revenues
exceeded expectations every year during the expansion,
probably due to the high level of realized capital gains.
Two less obvious factors also contributed to the
impressive state revenue performance of the end of
the millennium. First, 46 states and four major tobacco
companies signed the Master Settlement Agreement
in November 1998. To settle state lawsuits aimed at
recovering tobacco-related Medicaid costs, the tobacco
companies promised the states $206 billion over a
25-year period. The states began receiving money in
late November 1999 following the approval of the agree-
ment by the required number of states. During 1998,
2000, and 2001, states received $2.4 billion, $6.4 bil-
lion, and $6.9 billion, respectively, from the tobacco
settlement.5 Some states received even greater revenues
than indicated by the settlement, because they used
financial intermediaries to trade the 25-year stream of
benefits for a single lump sum. Wisconsin, for example,
arranged for a single payment. These tobacco monies
are large, even in the context of multibillion-dollar
state budgets. The $8.3 billion due to the states in 2002
is equivalent to 1.8 percent of state general fund rev-
enues in 2002 recommended budgets. For 2000, with-
out funds from the tobacco settlement, revenue growth
would have equaled 3.7 percent; including the settle-
ment raised the growth rate to 4.5 percent (Wilson,
1999; NCSL, 1999a).
While anti-smoking groups anticipated that these
funds would be spent on state smoking cessation ini-
tiatives and other health causes, the funds entered state
coffers with no strings attached. While some of these
funds have been spent to curb smoking, most have
simply served to increase revenues and have not been
earmarked for specific causes.
The second factor, aside from taxes, contributing
to state revenues during the expansion was the change
in the welfare program. When Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) changed to Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996 (dis-
cussed in more detail below), welfare funding changed
from a federal matching program to a fixed federal
block grant. Under the AFDC program, the declines
in caseloads that accompanied the programmatic change
and economic expansion would have led to a decline
in spending and, therefore, a decline in the federal
match. By contrast, under the new program, block
grants stayed fixed in the face of declines in the re-
cipient population. As a result, states could both cut
their own spending down to the levels required by
the legislation and use their funds to increase benefits
and restructure programs to support a wide array of
social services for their welfare populations.
Spending
Like revenues, state government spending has
generally been increasing over time. Between 1980
and 1992, real general government expenditure in-
creased by 4.4 percent overall per year and by 3.4
percent per capita. During the expansion, between
1992 and 1999, real expenditure growth slowed to
3.5 percent per year, or 2.5 percent per capita. Cen-
sus data on state government spending are only avail-
able until 1999 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of the Census, 2002a). More recent data from NAS-
BO show that real total state expenditure increased
by 5 percent between 1999 and 2000 and 5 percent
between 2000 and 2001 (NASBO, 2001c).6 Even in
the presence of impressive revenue growth, by 1999
appropriations growth was expected to outpace revenue
growth. In the light of the fiscal problems emerging in
fiscal 2002, governors recommended that appropria-
tions growth slow substantially.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
Service, 2001a and 2001b.
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State government spending is less cyclical than
revenue, because many of the major state services
are not particularly cyclically sensitive. For example,
enrollment in elementary and secondary education is
a function of past fertility decisions and is not very
responsive to the condition of the economy.
However, spending in some programmatic areas is
sensitive to economic conditions. The most obviously
cyclically sensitive area is need-based services. De-
mand for these services declines as the economy im-
proves and employment rates increase. Then, demand
grows in a downturn. States partially fund three cru-
cial need-based programs: unemployment insurance,
Medicaid (the health insurance program for the low-
income population), and welfare (TANF, formerly
AFDC). Among these, unemployment insurance is
covered by funds not considered as general expendi-
ture in the Census Bureau definitions.
That said, some expenditure pressures are even
slightly procyclical. This minor procyclicality derives
from the fact that states are major employers and com-
pete for their employees in the labor market. Labor
market tightness should lead to increased wage de-
mand among teachers, highway workers, police of-
ficers, and others employed by the state.
Looking at teachers, for example, we see
that real salaries rose during the expan-
sion. Between the 1991–92 and 1999–
2000 academic years, average nominal
teacher salaries rose by 23 percent and
starting teacher salaries by 28 percent
(American Federation of Teachers, 2002).
This second number is a better indication
of labor market tightness because educa-
tion systems compete against other em-
ployers for new college graduates. Between
1992 and 2000, total inflation was about
17 percent (this is the increase in prices as
measured by the gross national product
price index) (Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, Council of Economic Advisers, 2002).
In their role as employers, states were
faced with increased spending pressures during the
expansion, while in their role as providers of services
to the needy, they faced declining pressures. On bal-
ance, the expansion probably cut expenditure pres-
sures somewhat, but by no means dramatically.
To further investigate increases in expenditures,
I look at increases by spending category. Table 1 shows
the real dollar and percentage change in expenditure
in four major state spending categories between 1992
and 1999. Spending increased between 22 percent and
32 percent in all of these categories over the entire
period or from just under 3 percent to just over 4 per-
cent per year. The table also shows spending growth
in current and capital spending. Current expenditures
grew more quickly than capital outlays.
While funding increases during the expansion were
pretty universal, two areas deserve special attention:
education and Medicaid, which is classified by the
Census Bureau as part of public welfare.
Trends in Medicaid spending
The almost universally acknowledged source
of the states’ most significant spending woes is the
Medicaid program. Medicaid is the health insurance
program for low-income people. The program covered
over 40 million recipients in 1998. The states and fed-
eral government split Medicaid expenditures, with the
federal government picking up between 50 percent and
76.8 percent of the program’s costs. The federal share
decreases as state per capita income increases. Between
fiscal 1992 and fiscal 2001, real total Medicaid pro-
gram costs are estimated to have increased from $135
billion to $209 billion 1999 dollars or by 56 percent
in total and 5.1 percent per year (which actually rep-
resents a decline from the average annual rate of growth
TABLE 1
Changes in expenditure, 1992–99
1992 1999 Percent
expenditure expenditure  change
(1999 dollars, 000s) (000s)
Education 240,790,734 318,601,796 32
Public welfare 177,170,480 221,166,721 25
Highways 55,787,475 68,317,477 22
All other 224,402,866 281,389,231 25
All categories,
  current operations 368,391,413 476,968,246 29
All categories,
  capital outlays 57,117,136 68,508,917 20
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002a.
between 1980 and 1992 of 9.1 percent per year). Over
the same period, state Medicaid program costs are esti-
mated to have grown by a similar percentage (U.S. Con-
gress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2002).
Figure 2 depicts the growth in total nominal
Medicaid program costs from 1992 to 2001 (costs
for 1999–2001 are estimates), compared with the over-
all growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the
growth in the Consumer Price Index for Medical Care.
The figure shows that medical care expenses were
growing much more rapidly than the overall price6 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 2
Growth in Medicaid costs vs. inflation
level relative to 1992
Sources: CPI data from the Executive Office of the President,
Council of Economic Advisers, 2002. Medicaid data from U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2002.










level as reflected in the CPI, and Medicaid expenditures
were growing dramatically more rapidly than medical
care expenses. In other words, while some of the in-
crease in Medicaid expenditures can be attributed to an
overall increase in health care costs, most of the increase
needs to be explained by other factors. Medicaid ex-
penditures have also been increasing rapidly relative
to state government expenditures more generally, as
illustrated in figure 3, which depicts the growth in to-
tal state Medicaid program costs relative to the growth
in total state expenditure from 1992 to 1999.
We can break down the increase in costs into
two component parts—first, the increase
in the number of program recipients and,
second, the increase in the cost per recipi-
ent. Figure 4 shows three comparisons
between 1992 and 1998: the growth in
number of recipients by eligibility cate-
gory (panel A), the growth in per capita
Medicaid costs by eligibility category
(panel B), and the growth in total expen-
ditures by eligibility category (panel C).7
Spending increases by eligibility category
have been fairly similar—between 1992
and 1998, the percentage of expenditures
represented by each eligibility category
has been nearly constant. But the reasons
underlying these similar growth rates in
spending have differed somewhat. For
aged recipients, an increase in costs com-
bined with a relatively flat recipient pop-
ulation led to increased total spending.
For disabled recipients, both costs and
FIGURE 3
State government expenditure vs.
state share of Medicaid
millions millions
the recipient population grew. For children and adults,
a dramatic increase in the recipient population and
nearly constant costs per recipient underlie the growth
in total spending. The increase in the number of re-
cipient children and adults derives from legislated
extensions of coverage to children and parents of
poor families not receiving public assistance.8
As this discussion shows, it is difficult to attribute
the increase in Medicaid spending to one single force
as both eligibility and costs have increased. That said,
much of the debate on Medicaid program costs has
naturally focused on the aged and disabled groups.
Although these groups represent less than 30 percent
of all recipients, they account for over 70 percent of
program costs. Two particular areas of spending have
received special attention: nursing facilities and pre-
scription drugs. Nursing facilities accounted for 22.4
percent of total Medicaid payments in 1998 and 62.9
percent of the costs for aged recipients. It is the single
largest programmatic spending category. In fact,
Medicaid pays 46 percent of all U.S. nursing home
expenditures (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Health Care Financing Administration, 2000).
Prescription drugs represented 9.5 percent of all
Medicaid program costs in 1998 and spending for
drugs has been increasing rapidly. In 1992, drugs were
only 7.4 percent of program costs. These increases in
drug expenditures are attributed to a nationwide in-
crease in drug prices and the advent of a number of
new (hence, expensive) drugs. Medicaid drug expen-
diture increased by an additional 17.9 percent in 1999,
22.2 percent in 2000, and is estimated to increase by
Sources: State government expenditures are from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002a. Medicaid data from U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2002.
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Sources: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and
Means, 1996 and 2002.
an additional 19.7 percent and 14.9 percent in 2001
and 2002, respectively (NASBO, 2001a).
In addition to this general upward trend, Medicaid
spending does have a cyclical component as well,
because the loss of jobs and health insurance increases
the size of the medically dependent population. However,
this relationship should not be overstated. When I per-
formed simple regressions of the recipient population
between 1972 and 1998 on the civilian unemployment
rate, a time trend, and dummies controlling for legis-
lated changes in eligibility in 1990 and 1996, I only
found a statistically significant relationship between
the number of adult recipients and the unemployment
rate. For all other recipient categories, there is no dis-
cernible relationship between the unemployment rate
and the size of the recipient population. Because spend-
ing on adults is such a small part of total Medicaid
expenditure, this cyclical factor is not a huge part of
the Medicaid spending story.
Even though Medicaid spending is not very cy-
clical, worries about costs tend to be most common
when the economy is weakest. This is because state
budgetary problems become more acute during down-
turns and Medicaid is such a significant spending area.
This is no exception during the current economic cli-
mate. I discuss potential cost saving measures for
Medicaid in a later section.
Trends in education spending
Education spending, specifically spending for
elementary and secondary education, represents the
single greatest expenditure category for state govern-
ments. About $0.36 out of every $1.00 in general ex-
penditure is spent on education. Between 1992 and
1999, state education spending increased by 32 percent.
States cover just under half of total education expen-
diture, with local governments funding 40 percent to
45 percent and the federal government paying the re-
mainder (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, 2002c; U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics, 2001).
The growth in school expenditure results from a
number of sources. First, there was an increase in the
number of pupils in elementary and secondary schools.
Between 1992 and 1999, the number of pupils increased
by 9.4 percent. However, as this percentage increase
is less than one-third of the percentage increase in ex-
penditure, other forces are needed to explain the total
increase in costs. Second, over the same period, the num-
ber of teachers increased by 18.2 percent. The result-
ant increase in the teacher–pupil ratio represents the
continuation of a long-standing trend in education.
Costs for instruction (teachers and textbooks) represent
53 percent of total education expenditure, so the growth
in teachers, combined with the increase in teacher sala-
ries discussed earlier, goes a long way toward explain-
ing the increase in total expenditures.9 Third, during the
boom, states increased spending on school-related8 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
capital projects. Capital expenditure jumped from
7.6 percent of school expenditures in 1990 to 9.9
percent in both 1999 and 2000 (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002c). This
increase in capital spending was needed to help shore
up deteriorating school buildings and assure compli-
ance with federal mandates regarding accessibility
and health hazards (U.S. Congress, General Account-
ing Office, 1995). Despite this increase in capital
spending, school buildings continue to be in poor
shape, with 50 percent reporting at least one inade-
quate building feature as of 1999 (U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002c). Finally,
although precise national statistics on special educa-
tion spending are not available, there is a general
consensus that increases in the number of students
with diagnosed disabilities have challenged the re-
sources of school districts. Between the 1992–93 and
1998–99 school years, the percentage of students
with a disability increased from 11.8 percent to 13.0
percent. In 1976–77, only 8.3 percent of students
were diagnosed with a disability.
School expenditure holds a privileged position in
the debate over state expenditure. While it is the larg-
est single expenditure area, it is also very politically
popular and somewhat sacred. Discussions of school
spending on the state level often take place outside the
general budget debate and it is the area most frequently
exempted from across-the-board budget cuts.
Overall spending growth is driven by a number
of factors, but the two largest programmatic areas—
Medicaid and education—go a long way toward ex-
plaining the overall condition of state budgets. Spending
in both of these areas increased throughout the expan-
sion. And as budgets tighten, much of the debate in-
evitably focuses on these two areas.
One other feature of state expenditure deserves
attention. During an expansion, when state expenditure
rises, increases for programs are debated and specifi-
cally funded. However, during budget crises, cuts tend
to be across the board. (I discuss this issue in greater
detail below). In other words, budget cuts are neither
specific nor particularly debated. As a result, state agen-
cies have an added incentive to maximize their bud-
get by adding items that will be easy to cut in time of
crisis. So, if individual agencies are concerned about
the economic cycle, it is in their best interest not to
save now for later, but to spend more.
Tax cutting
Throughout the economic boom, states reduced
the tax obligations of businesses and individuals with-
in their borders. The federal program that sent tax
rebate checks to households in 2001 disbursed a total
of $38 billion. Combined, the 50 states reduced taxes
between 1995 and 2000 by a similar amount, $36 bil-
lion in 2001 dollars (NCSL, 2001c).10 Some of the
state reductions are permanent, such as legislated re-
ductions in income tax rates. Other reductions were
one-time events, such as tax rebates and refunds.
States also reduced tax burdens further by providing
funding to localities to reduce property tax burdens.
These tax reductions served to bolster the already ro-
bust macroeconomy by returning funds to individu-
als at the same time as other forces were serving to
increase personal income. The tax reductions were
widespread, occurring every year between 1995 and
2001 and occurring in some manner in all 50 states.
Figure 5 graphs net yearly state tax changes as a
percent of the previous year’s tax collections against
the year-over-year percentage change in second quar-
ter gross domestic product (GDP is seasonally adjust-
ed at annual rates). I use second-quarter GDP because
most state fiscal years end at the end of the second
quarter. Therefore, the two lines correspond to simi-
lar periods. Most tax reductions take effect in the year
after the year of passage. The figure shows that as the
percentage change in GDP turned positive in 1992,
enacted tax increases began to fall, finally turning neg-
ative (into a net tax decrease) in 1995. The correlation
between the two sets of numbers is a striking –0.8,
showing the close connection between GDP growth
and tax cuts. The figure also shows that the tax cut-
ting continued in earnest until 2000. The preliminary
2001 number shows a continued decline in taxes dur-
ing the 2001 legislative session as well.
These data do not distinguish between one-time
tax rebates and permanent changes in taxes. Therefore,
this figure only accurately depicts the change from one
year to the next and does not show aggregate changes
over a number of years. Many of the enacted changes
represented permanent changes and, therefore, the to-
tal tax reductions over time are greater than the sim-
ple sum of the numbers presented in the figure.
As the figure shows, extensive tax cutting began
in 1995—the first year since 1985 that states engaged
in a net tax reduction (Mackey, 1999). In the 1995
legislative session, states reduced the taxes to be col-
lected in fiscal 1996 by $3.3 billion—0.9 percent of
the previous year’s tax collections. Most reductions
occurred in the traditionally unpopular personal in-
come tax. Personal income tax reductions represent-
ed $1.1 billion of the decline. Reflecting on the 1995
tax reduction, Scott Mackey of the National Confer-
ence of State Legislators wrote: “There are several
reasons to think that state tax cutting activity may have9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 5
Net tax changes vs. changes in GDP
percent
Note: 2001 data are preliminary.
Sources: GDP data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, 2002a; tax data from NCSL, 2001c and 2000.
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FIGURE 6
Tax reductions by type of tax
reductions in billions of current dollars
Source: NCSL, 2001a, 2001c, 2000, 1999a, and 1999b.












peaked during 1995. First, federal budget cuts that
affect state budgets are a virtual certainty in 1995
and beyond, making states cautious about reducing
revenues. Second, the strong revenue growth that
states enjoyed in fiscal year (FY) 1994 and FY1995
appears to be returning to more modest levels. Finally,
local property tax relief may be a higher priority than
reducing state taxes” (Mackey, 1999). Mr. Mackey’s
prediction proved wide of the mark. In 1996, states
reduced taxes again. It was the first time that states had
cut taxes in two consecutive years since FY1979–80.
Further tax reductions occurred in the next five years.
Figure 6 shows the reduction in taxes by year for
the major tax categories—personal income tax, corporate
income tax, sales and use taxes, and others. Other tax-
es include health care, motor fuel, cigarette, alcohol,
and miscellaneous taxes. As the figure demonstrates,
the tax cuts throughout the period tended to follow a
general pattern. Every year, the main focus of cuts was
personal income tax. Personal income tax was cut
across numerous dimensions—rates were reduced in
some cases, in others the base was narrowed, while
other states chose to increase standard deductions or
exemptions, or issue refunds. Corporate income taxes
were also reduced, but not to as great an extent as per-
sonal income taxes. Sales and use taxes were largely
stable, with some increases in exemptions for food,
drugs, and other necessities. Figure 6 shows that oth-
er taxes were also cut throughout the period. Most of
these declines in other taxes represent changes in state-
specific tax programs such as Florida’s 1997 enact-
ment of a $411 million freeze in the special assessment
for the special disability trust fund. As a result, these
other tax changes are difficult to generalize. One ex-
ception to this general pattern, not shown in the fig-
ure, is that throughout the decade, “sin” taxes on alcohol
and tobacco were stable or increasing. In fact, tobacco
taxes increased every year between 1995 and 2001,
except 1998 when they remained unchanged.
Tax cutting in the Midwest
Tax cutting was persistent, across the board, and
widespread throughout the second half of the decade.
The behavior of the midwestern states was represen-
tative of this overall pattern. Faced with unexpectedly
high revenues, state governors and legislators chose
to return some monies to state residents and resident
corporations. In this section, I briefly detail the major
revenue actions undertaken in Indiana, Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, and Wisconsin during this period.
Michigan was one of the most aggressive tax cut-
ters, legislating significant tax reductions on numerous
occasions during the second half of the 1990s. As
was the case with the overall pattern of tax cuts, the
major source of cuts was the personal income tax. In
1995, Michigan increased personal exemptions and
standard deductions. This was followed by a tax cut
passed in 1999 that cut income tax rates and expand-
ed personal exemptions even further. This second cut
reduced taxes by $218 million dollars. Prior to the
start of the expansion, businesses in Michigan were
heavily taxed, relative to corporations in other states.
As of 1992, corporate income taxes represented 7.8
percent of Michigan’s general revenues, compared
with 3.6 percent across all states. In order to increase
state competitiveness, the Michigan legislature sig-
nificantly reduced business taxes in 1995 and 1999.10 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
The reductions in personal and corporate income tax-
es continued to be phased in through 2002. Michigan
was also typical in that any taxes that were increased
were excise taxes. In 1997, motor fuel taxes were in-
creased, and in 1999 there was a major increase in
cigarette taxation, bringing in an additional $95.2
million in revenues.
Illinois’s tax reductions were similar in direction
to those in Michigan, but smaller in magnitude. The
main tax cut was a three-year doubling of the personal
income tax exemption passed in 1998. This was viewed
as a welcome change in Illinois’s historically regres-
sive income tax policies. Illinois also slightly reduced
corporate income taxes, but the change was not as sig-
nificant as in Michigan. In 1999, Illinois engaged in
a significant excise tax hike. In order to fund a major
state public works program, state leaders increased
motor vehicle and liquor taxes. The program, termed
“Illinois FIRST,” was passed as a five-year, $12 billion
program. Two other tax reductions were a 2000 prop-
erty tax rebate program and an increase in the state
earned income tax program.
Wisconsin’s most notable tax reductions were en-
acted in 1999. The state rebated $700 million in excess
sales tax revenues to taxpayers who had filed income
tax returns in 1998. The state also reformed the per-
sonal income tax by increasing standard deductions,
reducing rates, and raising credits for married couples.
These changes saved taxpayers $655 million.
Indiana’s major tax reduction was passed during
the 1999 legislative session when a major property tax
decrease was coupled with an increase in the dependent
child exemption to $1,000 per child. The state also
changed excise taxes, reducing the unpopular automo-
bile excise tax in 1996, while increasing motor vehi-
cle license fees in 1998.
Although Iowa is the least populous midwestern
state, it was one of the most aggressive tax cutters. The
major tax changes in Iowa were almost exclusively in
the personal income tax. In 1995, personal exemptions
and standard deductions were increased, while in 1997
personal income tax rates were reduced.
Overall, tax changes in the midwestern states were
fairly representative of those taking place across the
nation. The major source of cuts was personal income
tax. States both increased exemptions and deductions
and lowered tax rates. Some states also decreased cor-
porate income taxes, but not to nearly as large an ex-
tent. The states only engaged in minor changes in excise
taxes. Some states also acted to reduce or rebate some
of the perennially unpopular property tax.
We have seen how during the expansion, states
used some of their windfall revenues to engage in the
very popular activity of cutting taxes. However, they
also used some of these excess funds to prepare for
future economic contingencies by shoring up their
reserve funds. In the next section, I explore the con-
dition of state rainy day funds and other reserves and
the extent to which states prepared for a downturn in
the economic cycle.
Reserve funds
In order to confront unexpected shortfalls and eco-
nomic downturns, states maintain reserves. These re-
serves may be in the form of ending balances in the
general fund, monies in a budget stabilization fund,
or monies in a diverse array of other emergency funds.
Specific rules govern when states may access the
monies in budget stabilization or “rainy day” funds.
By contrast, access to general fund ending balances
is controlled by the same type of legislation that reg-
ulates other general fund appropriations. As a result,
it is politically more complicated for states to access
rainy day balances in the absence of an obvious need.
As in the case of withdrawals, deposits for rainy day
funds are controlled by specific provisions.
All but three states have budget stabilization funds,
which may be budget reserve funds, revenue shortfall
accounts, or cash flow accounts. Those states without
rainy day funds maintain all reserves as ending balances
in their general fund accounts. In 2000, just under half
of all reserves were maintained in rainy day funds, the
other half remaining as general fund ending balances.
Three-fifths of states limit the size of rainy day fund
balances to between 3 percent and 10 percent of appro-
priations. Funds above those permitted in the budget
stabilization fund remain in the state’s ending balance
(NASBO, 2001a).
Reserves, whether in rainy day funds or as general
fund ending balances, offer states an important source
of funds when unexpected contingencies threaten to
disrupt fiscal functions. It is frequently cited that Wall
Street views any total level of reserves in excess of 5
percent of expenditures as adequate. Figure 7 depicts
total state reserves as a percent of total state expendi-
tures from FY1979 to FY2002. The figure also depicts
the year over year percentage change in U.S. real GDP
as of the second quarter (the end point for most state
fiscal years). The data demonstrate a number of impor-
tant patterns concerning reserves. First, reserves have
been quite strong. According to the data displayed in
the figure, by 1998, state reserve fund balances ex-
ceeded the heights they had attained in 1980. Fiscal
year 2002 is projected to be the ninth consecutive year
with total state reserves above 5 percent of expendi-
tures. As of June 2001, 2002 reserves were anticipated11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
to be 5.9 percent of expenditures. However, while
reserves remain high relative to their historical patterns,
they fell between 2000 and 2001 and are expected to
continue falling in fiscal 2002. Total reserve fund bal-
ances reached a high of 10.1 percent of expenditures
in 2000 and were expected to decline to 5.9 percent by
the end of FY2002. This projection for 2002, based
on governors’ recommended budgets, is probably op-
timistic, because these estimates were published in June
2001 when the economic outlook was better. Even these
optimistic forecasts predict that fiscal 2002 reserve
balances as a percentage of expenditures will be low-
er than they have been in the past seven years. These
averages mask significant variety across states. While
22 states anticipated total reserve balances below 5 per-
cent of expenditures for 2002, four predicted balanc-
es would exceed 10 percent. The decline since 2000 is
widespread. In 2000, 21 states had reserve fund balanc-
es above 10 percent and 11 had reserve fund balances
below 5 percent. Reserve fund balances have declined
over the past two years due to additional tax cuts, in-
creases in spending especially in the areas of health
care and education, and the slowing of the economy.
The data also show how quickly reserves can fall
in responses to economic difficulties. Between 1989
and 1991, reserves fell from 4.8 percent of expendi-
tures to 1.1 percent of expenditures. So, while reserves
were nearly adequate according to the oft-cited Wall
Street rule of thumb prior to the early 1990s downturn,
they nearly evaporated in just two difficult years.
This begs the question whether the reserves that
states built up during the booming 1990s are sufficient
FIGURE 7
Total reserve fund balances vs. changes in GDP
percent
Note: Total balances include both ending balances in the general
fund and amounts in budget stabilization funds.
Sources: GDP data from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2002a; balances from National















to help them weather the current economic storm. The
news reports from state governments suggest (discussed
in detail below) that these reserves are not sufficient
to allow states to endure the current economic situa-
tion without cutting spending or raising taxes.
The inadequacy of state reserves to maintain ser-
vices in the event of a downturn was addressed in an
article by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(CBPP) in March 1999 and updated in May 2000 (Lav
and Berube, 1999, and Zahradnik and Lav, 2000). The
authors calculate the amount of reserves each state would
need to endure a recession without cutting programs
dramatically or enacting significant tax increases. They
then compare this level of needed reserves to the level
available. In their calculations, the authors assume that
states would face a fall in the growth rate of revenues
between FY2000 and FY2003 similar to the decline
experienced between FY1989 and FY1992 that cor-
responded to the 1990 recession. This methodology
leads them to assume that the growth rate of revenues
would be 43 percent of the growth rate from FY1993
and FY1998. At the same time, they assume that state
expenditures would grow at the same pace as they
did between 1989 and 1998. The authors calculate
the needed reserves as the gap between expenditures
and revenues over the three-year period.11 These cal-
culations yield a conservative estimate of necessary
reserves, because the 1990 recession was relative short-
lived and mild. In addition, as mentioned above, the
demand for government services tends to increase
slightly more rapidly during a recession, suggesting
the growth rate in expenditures (absent government
action) would be greater than experienced between
1989 and 1998. The authors conclude that only eight
states (Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, and North Dakota) had
adequate reserves on hand to combat a relatively mild
recession. Other states had reserves that were lower
than needed. In fact, they find that in most states re-
serves on hand were more than 10 percent of expen-
diture below what was required to maintain services.
In their follow-up report, the authors noted that five
of those original eight states (Delaware, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota) had enacted
tax cuts since the previous publication that left them
without sufficient reserves. The CBPP report also ar-
gues that the statistic that 5 percent of expenditures is
sufficient, while frequently cited, is “of uncertain ori-
gin and even more questionable validity.” They argue
that reserves equal to 5 percent of expenditures are
insufficient for managing recessions in all but a couple
of states. The report correctly points out that needed
reserves vary from state to state. States that depend12 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
heavily on cyclical sources of revenue, especially in-
come taxes, need a greater level of reserves. The 5 per-
cent statistic better represents the level needed on hand
for unpredictable emergencies, perhaps an event like
September 11, than the level required to counteract
revenue losses caused by the business cycle.
This leads one to question why states did not take
advantage of the strong economy and move to build
adequate reserves, and why those few states with suf-
ficient reserves had spent them. The simple answer to
both of these questions would be that it is far easier
to spend money than to save it. One might say state
leaders are either myopic and do not worry about fu-
ture economic difficulties or are overly optimistic and,
thus, did not believe another recession was likely. How-
ever, such thinking misses the important point that states
do not view reserve funds as designed to allow them
to maintain services in a downturn. Rather they view
these funds as allowing a window during which they
can adjust their budgets and cut services or raise taxes
in an orderly fashion. In other words, reserve funds
are designed to allow states time to build the ark; they
are not designed to carry them through the deluge.
The evidence for this distinction is widespread.
First, most states cap the amount of money allowed
in the reserve fund. Thirty-three of the 46 states with
rainy day funds cap the amount allowed in the fund.
Most of the caps are at or below 5 percent of expen-
ditures. If states wanted these funds to counteract the
fiscal effects of recession, they would not cap them at
such a low level. Second, the language used by states
when discussing their reserves tends to be based on
concern for unexpected or short-term disruptions, not
prolonged economic problems.
For example, Illinois passed Rainy Day Fund
legislation in April 2000. The state controller made the
first deposit into the new fund on July 1, 2001. The
Illinois fund is capped at $600 million (2.6 percent
of 2000 state general fund expenditure). Previously,
the entire ending balance had been left in the general
fund. In a press release praising the legislature’s ac-
tion, Governor George Ryan stated that the fund was
“for use at the discretion of the governor and General
Assembly in the event of an unseen economic down-
turn that threatens state services (State of Illinois,
2000).” The language used by NASBO in explaining
reserve funds is similar. They write, “[T]otal balanc-
es reflect the funds states may use to respond to un-
foreseen circumstances after budget obligations have
been met” (NASBO, 2001a).
State balanced budget requirements and debt re-
strictions limit the ability of states to borrow to meet
short-term needs. In lieu of access to short-term credit
markets, states maintain reserves, permitting them to
dip into savings rather than borrow. These reserve
funds buy states time, giving them the opportunity and
flexibility to adjust their budgets in a deliberate, sen-
sible manner. These funds help states avoid fiscal gim-
mickry to affect budget balances. However, the reserve
funds do not allow states to emerge unscathed from
recessions. For better or worse, state governments cling
firmly to their balanced budget requirements and be-
lieve that they ought to spend in one year what they
receive in that year (or over two years in states with
biennial budget cycles). That said, overall state fiscal
health would improve if reserve funds were adequate
to allow states to maintain, or even increase, spend-
ing without increasing taxes during economic down-
turns. Preserving balances for this purpose would
require a change in thinking about state budgeting.
Midwestern states’ reserves
Table 2 shows the level of reserves as a percent
of general fund expenditures in the midwestern states
and for the nation as a whole from FY1998 to FY2002.
The data show that reserves among this group of states
have been fairly typical of the U.S. averages—reach-
ing high levels over the past five years, though fall-
ing more recently. With the exception of Wisconsin
in 2001–02, all midwestern states have maintained
reserves above the 5 percent threshold. The final col-
umn of the table also displays the level of reserves
needed to survive a mild recession, according to the
CBPP report. These numbers tend to vary quite dra-
matically across states.
Wisconsin’s reserves are the weakest of the group.
They declined dramatically between 2000 and 2001,
principally due to tax rebates passed in 1999. At the
same time, Wisconsin’s required recession reserves
are the highest of the Midwest states and the eighth
highest among the 50 states.
Illinois’s reserves have been quite stable over the
past five years, hovering close to the 5 percent mark.
By contrast, required reserves are quite high, suggesting
that Illinois will face fiscal difficulties.
Both Iowa and Indiana have reserves that have been
declining over time but are slightly above the nation-
al average. Their required reserves are lower than the
national average, but still double the level of reserves
on hand.
Michigan’s reserves have proven the strongest
among this group of states, exceeding 10 percent in
all five years presented in the table. As of 1999,
Michigan exceeded the reserves required to withstand
a recession by 10 percent. However, significant tax13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
cuts enacted during the last years of the expansion
have increased the state’s required reserves from the
5.1 percent reported in the table to 25.0 percent.
Therefore, after aggressive tax-cutting, Michigan’s
reserves were quite low relative to required levels.
The experience of the midwestern states has been
fairly typical. Reserves are high relative to historical
levels, but low relative to cyclical requirements. The
only states with low reserves as a group are a number
of southern states—Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee—that did
not benefit as much from the economic expansion as
states in other regions.
Indebtedness
In addition to lowering taxes, increasing spend-
ing, and bolstering reserves, states also had the option
of using their new-found revenues in the 1990s to re-
duce their indebtedness. States are not major debtors.
Total outstanding state debt at the end of FY1999 of
$510 billion represented just 51 percent of total an-
nual state expenditure (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 2002a). By comparison, the
federal government’s indebtedness is over three times
its annual expenditures (U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 2002c). On balance, real state
indebtedness actually increased by 20 percent between
1992 and 1999, but this was less than the percentage
increase in expenditure. Because most debt is long
term and funds specific capital projects, it is not sur-
prising that debt increased at a time that capital spend-
ing was also increasing. While states could have used
their surplus funds to pay down their debt or fund
more capital projects out of current funds, they did
not do so. The only kind of debt that declined during
the expansion was short-term debt, which was 21 per-
cent lower at the end of 1999 than at the end of 1992.
TABLE 2
Reserve balances as percent of expenditures
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Required reserves
(as of 1999)
Illinois 6.10 6.30 6.60 5.70 5.60 22.90
Indiana 23.00 20.60 18.30 9.80 8.30 14.90
Iowa 19.60 16.00 13.40 9.80 8.20 16.30
Michigan 12.20 15.40 15.10 12.90 12.90 5.10
Wisconsin 5.70 7.00 7.40 2.70 2.00 27.00
5 state total 10.90 11.00 10.50 7.30 6.70
50 state total 11.00 8.90 11.90 9.10 6.30 18.60
Note: Data for 2001 are estimated and data for 2002 are from recommended budgets.
Sources: Required reserves from Lav and Berube, 1999; reserves from National Association of State Budget Officers, 1999 and 2001a.
This type of debt that matures in one year or less com-
prises bond and tax anticipation notes and is a barom-
eter of the health of state finances.
The bust: Revenues
The first real signs of the deterioration in state bud-
gets were seen in the third quarter of 2000. These signs
could be seen in the revenue numbers being reported
by state governments. Figure 8 shows year-over-year
changes in quarterly tax revenues both in total and
for sales taxes. As the figure shows, between the third
quarter of 1999 and the third quarter of 2000, state
tax revenues, adjusting for tax changes and inflation,
had grown by only 4.1 percent. These data for total
tax revenues are estimates of what state revenues would
have been had legislated tax changes not occurred.
State revenue growth had slowed for the first time in
a year and was only half the growth rate reported in
the previous quarter. The changes in actual sales tax
revenues were even more dramatic relative to their
historical trend. Sales tax revenues grew by 4.7 per-
cent that quarter, the lowest growth rate reported since
the first half of 1997. These sales tax revenue numbers,
unadjusted for inflation or tax changes, are probably
the most reliable indication of the revenue situation.
Major legislated changes in the sales tax are rare and,
as a result, these numbers do not rely upon predictions
of the effects of legislated changes.
At this juncture, there was a great deal of variation
in the financial situation confronting different states and
regions. Figure 9 displays changes in year-over-year
sales tax revenues, by quarter, for the various regions.
The figure shows that, as of the second quarter of 2000,
some regions were doing far better and others far worse
than the national averages. In particular, sales tax reve-
nues in the Far West were growing well above the na-
tional average, while revenues in the Mid-Atlantic,14 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
Great Lakes, and Southeast were lagging the national
average. Between the second and third quarter, growth
rates dropped off in all areas, with the exception of the
Mid-Atlantic and Rocky Mountain states, where they
were flat. Revenues in these two regions fell the fol-
lowing quarter. Some states were still well entrenched
in the impressive expansion, while others were falling
quickly into revenue troubles.
The decline in the growth rate of tax revenues
first hinted at in the third quarter of 2000 accelerated
in all the subsequent quarters for which data are avail-
able except one. In the third quarter of 2001, overall
tax revenues and sales tax revenues fell. Between the
third quarter of 2000 and the third quarter of 2001,
revenues had fallen in nearly every region, exceptions
being the Southeast and Southeast where revenues
were close to flat. We see a similar picture when we
look at the revenue growth rates for the second quar-
ter of 2001. Although still positive, revenue growth
rates were weak in all regions. The state revenue sit-
uation was rapidly deteriorating in advance of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Although it is
difficult to distinguish the effects of the attacks from
the effects of a continuing secular decline in revenues,
there is little doubt that state finances were in trouble
before September 2001.
Next, I look at personal income tax revenues.
Because of the frequency of legislated changes in
this tax, I present numbers that are unadjusted for
legislated tax changes, as well as adjusted numbers.
Unadjusted revenues are the revenues actually re-
ceived by the state government. Adjusted numbers
FIGURE 8
Year-over-year changes in tax revenues,
by quarter
Note: Total tax revenues are adjusted for tax changes and
inflation. Sales tax revenues are actual nominal receipts.
Sources: Jenny, 2001, and Jenny and Boyd, 2001.












display estimates of what receipts would have been
had the legislature not changed the tax code. While
income tax revenues, adjusting for legislated tax
changes, held up through the end of 2000, the income
tax situation was also poor by mid-2001. Figure 10
depicts the quarterly change in personal income tax
revenues by quarter, both adjusted for legislated tax
changes and unadjusted. Because nearly all income
tax changes lowered taxes, the unadjusted line (reve-
nues actually received) lies almost entirely below the
adjusted line. Income tax revenue changes are more
difficult to interpret than changes in sales tax reve-
nues for two principal reasons. First, the income tax
is frequently changed and even thorough estimates of
the effects of legislated tax changes are bound to be
imprecise. Second, because taxes must be filed prior
to April 15, there is a high level of seasonality in in-
come tax revenues and, as a result, comparisons across
quarters are quite difficult. The fall in income tax
revenues is more easily understood by looking at the
changes in year-over-year revenues by quarter as
show in figure 11. This figure shows that in every
quarter since 2000:Q4, revenue growth rates have
fallen below their level from a year earlier. The fact
that income tax revenues fell slightly later than sales
tax revenues suggests that the more sales-tax-depen-
dent states were likely confronted with revenue is-
sues earlier than more income-tax-dependent states.
When looked at from numerous angles, the state
revenue situation appears poor. Revenue growth rates
slowed early relative to the slowdown in GDP and have
continued to decline. Revenue numbers also contin-
ued to fall below already reduced expectations and,
by November 2001, 43 states were reporting that
revenues had come in below what they had anticipat-
ed for FY2002. By April 2002, this number had risen
to 48 states. (NCSL, 2001b; NCSL 2002)
Expenditures
Unsurprisingly, this decline in revenues has not
coincided with a decline in the demand for state ser-
vices. On the contrary, among the 43 states reporting
revenue shortfalls for FY2002 in November 2001
(NCSL, 2001b), 20 were also reporting that spending
was exceeding levels anticipated when fiscal 2002 bud-
gets were passed. By April 2002, 33 states were re-
porting spending overruns (NCSL, 2002). Predictably
enough, the main source of spending overruns and con-
cerns involved the Medicaid program. Nearly every
state that reported spending problems, along with some
that reported that spending remained on target, high-
lighted Medicaid spending as problematic.
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FIGURE 10
Year-over-year percent changes in personal
income tax revenues, by quarter
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Sources: Jenny, 2001, and Jenny and Boyd, 2001.
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Next, I look at how states might respond to this
budget predicament. To do so, I examine how the states
reacted to previous downturns, how the states hit ear-
liest by the current recession have reacted so far, and
the projections and pronouncements coming from
state capitols.
State reactions: The 1991 recession
The 1991 recession was mild and relatively short
compared with previous downturns, but it hit the states
very hard. States dramatically cut services and enacted
large tax hikes (see figure 5). Many of these changes
occurred in the middle of the fiscal year. In many cases,
states were compelled to change their enacted budget
mid-year to avoid running foul of their balanced bud-
get provisions. Reducing enacted budgets is a sign that
the economy is worse than was anticipated when the
original budget was passed. Thirty-five states faced a
potential budget deficit at one point from 1990 to 1992,
and 20 or more states acted to reduce enacted budgets
during each year from fiscal 1990 to fiscal 1993. The
worst year was 1991, when 30 states faced a mid-fis-
cal-year deficit of nearly $15 billion (2.7 percent of
general expenditures). In 1991, states drew down their
reserve balances. Balances at the start of the downturn
were reasonably healthy, totaling 4.8 percent of ex-
penditures in 1989. However, by 1991 balances had
fallen to 1.1 percent of expenditures. A similar pattern
existed during the 1980s recession. For example, bal-
ances declined from 9 percent to 4.4 percent in the one-
year period from fiscal 1980 to fiscal 1981 (shown in
figure 7). In 1991, states were also forced to cut their
budgets by $7.6 billion.
Because balances had been used to deal with the
1991 fiscal situation, these excess funds were no long-
er available in FY1992 and FY1993. With little avail-
able reserves, states were forced to reduce current16 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 11
Percent change in quarterly income
tax revenues
percent
Sources: Jenny, 2001, and Jenny and Boyd, 2001.












year budgets further and raise taxes. In 1992 and 1993,
35 states and 23 states, respectively, reduced current-
year budgets, and states raised taxes by a total of $25
billion. If spending cuts and tax increases were insuf-
ficient, states resorted to fiscal gimmickry to affect
budget balances. The most popular form of gimmick-
ry is for states to postpone payments to vendors, em-
ployees, and other recipients of state funds. Illinois
was one of the main practitioners, increasing the time
between the receipt and payment of bills. States could
also speed up the collection of revenues by forcing
vendors to remit payments to the states more quickly.
Enacted budget reductions are very disruptive to
service provision, because budget changes need to go
into effect almost immediately (and sometimes even
retroactively) leaving state agencies and their clients
little time to anticipate and adapt to the changes. While
declines in service provision can take effect almost im-
mediately, tax increases take longer. Most tax increas-
es go into effect in the fiscal year following the year
of passage.
States can only cut spending mid-year for a select
range of programs. Many programs are nearly impos-
sible to cut mid-year. The largest item in state budgets,
elementary and secondary education, is hard to reduce
once teacher contracts have been signed. Also, school-
ing involves significant start-up costs that occur in the
beginning of the school year, which is fairly early in
the fiscal year in most states. By mid-fiscal year, school
expenditure is fairly inflexible. In the early 1990s, there-
fore, states cut spending on those programs where
cuts were possible mid-year, which tended to be pro-
grams that serve the poor (Lav and Berube, 1999).
The largest of these programs—then AFDC, now
TANF—has undergone a series of changes that will
greatly limit the states’ ability to cut funds in the future.
In 1996, the program changed from an entitlement pro-
gram where the states and federal government split
payments to a discretionary program where specific
amounts were block granted to each state. States
were given more control over the structure of their pro-
grams, with the exception that they needed to maintain
spending at or above 75 percent of their 1994 spending
level if they met work requirement provisions, and at
or above 80 percent of their 1994 spending level if
these work requirements were not met. These “main-
tenance of effort” provisions prohibit states from re-
ducing their expenditure below a certain level.
Throughout the recent economic boom, caseloads
have dramatically dropped and the maintenance of
effort provisions has proved to be binding in a number
of cases. In federal fiscal year 2000, only 11 states spent
more than 80 percent of their 1994 baseline, with 15
states spending exactly 75 percent of their 1994 level
and five states spending exactly 80 percent. The com-
bination of relative fixed funding levels and smaller
case loads has meant that states have been able to sup-
port their dependent populations with a wide array of
benefits and services in addition to cash grants. Such
additional programs include work transportation, child-
care, and housing assistance. In the face of significant
fiscal pressures, states will not be able to decrease
funding levels below their maintenance of effort require-
ments. However, they may well keep funding at, or
lower funding to, the maintenance of effort levels.
A number of states will actually be able to increase
total TANF funding during an economic downturn
without harm to their budget situation, because these
states have not spent their entire block grants, leav-
ing excess amounts on account with the federal gov-
ernment. The TANF legislation explicitly allows states
to reserve part of their block grant for future spend-
ing. Funds reserved with the federal government can
be spent in subsequent years on “assistance.” While
states will not be able to spend these monies on the
wide array of “non-assistance” purposes that TANF
has funded, these funds will allow greater expenditure
on cash benefits.
Unspent TANF funds are categorized in one of two
ways for federal reporting purposes—as either unob-
ligated funds or as unliquidated obligations. Unobli-
gated funds are monies neither committed nor expended;
these funds would be available for additional cash as-
sistance spending during a period of economy hardship.
Unliquidated obligations are payments that have been
committed by state governments, but not yet spent.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Additionally, in some states portions of unliquidated
obligations are not truly committed and would also
be available during a downturn.12 The true measure-
ment of available funds lies somewhere between the
level of unobligated funds and the sum of both types
of unspent funds.
As of the end of federal FY2000, the 50 states had
$2.7 billion in unobligated funds on account at the
federal government and $8 billion in total unspent
funds. This represents 9.7 percent and 28.6 percent,
respectively, of total required state and federal TANF
spending in federal FY2001, where required state and
federal spending is defined as the sum of the 2001 TANF
grant and the 80 percent maintenance of effort provi-
sion. There is a great deal of variation in the amounts
available to different states. While 11 states have less
than 10 percent of one year’s funding unspent, nine
states have more than 50 percent of a year’s funding
unspent (Lazere, 2001).
These unused block grants are an additional form
of rainy day reserves, providing states with an added
cushion as the economy declines. Therefore, TANF
spending changes will be more complicated in the com-
ing days. On the one hand, the saved block grants will
make it easier for states with saved amounts to increase
spending, and the maintenance of effort provisions
will not allow states to cut spending below a certain
threshold. On the other hand, states have added flexi-
bility to cut expenditure to the level of their mainte-
nance of effort requirement, because the program is
no longer an entitlement program.
If the dependent population increases, as occurs
with a deteriorating economy, and funding levels stay
relatively fixed or increase only slightly, benefits and
services will inevitably be cut. The most likely targets
for cutting will be those same creative new benefits
in transportation and childcare that have characterized
the very successful first years of TANF.13
If state behavior during the current downturn par-
allels that taken during the 1991 recession, we will
see states begin by drawing down their balances and
cutting budgets and then progress to cutting spending
more dramatically and increasing taxes.
The 2001 recession: Action thus far
The combination of lower revenues and high or
stable spending has meant that state budgets are com-
ing increasingly under pressure. State governments have
taken various actions to confront these budget issues
and bring their FY2002 budgets into balance. State
governors have also begun to put forward their FY2003
budgets. As of November 2001, 36 states had cut their
budgets for fiscal 2002, 24 had decided to use some
of their reserves, and 22 had turned to other measures,
explained by the NCSL (2001b) as including “hiring
freezes, capital project cancellations, and travel restric-
tions.” By April 2002, 40 states had reduced or were
planning to reduce their budgets, 26 had turned to
their rainy day funds, and 17 were eyeing tobacco
settlement dollars (NCSL, 2002).
Mid-year budget cuts are often across the board,
with nearly all departments faced with funds a few
percentage points below previously budgeted levels.
In many states some sacrosanct departments, particu-
larly K–12 education, are spared from these cuts. Across
the board spending cuts are common perhaps because
they are the easiest to implement quickly. Because states
need to bring their budgets back into balance quickly,
they lack the ability to carefully determine areas where
budget reductions would be least damaging. It then
falls to the individual state agencies to choose the ex-
act programs where the reductions will be implement-
ed. More specific budgetary debate has accompanied
the early discussions concerning 2003 budgets.
As states have debated spending cuts, attention has
inevitably turned to the Medicaid program. Through-
out the 1990s expansion, there was little broad discus-
sion of the problems with Medicaid spending. Although
health care expenditure specialists did debate the is-
sue, debate was not widespread. As the economic sit-
uation has deteriorated, Medicaid spending has once
again come to the fore. This is not surprising, given
that it is a quickly growing program that already ac-
counts for nearly 20 percent of all state expenditures.
To reduce costs, states have both restricted eligibility
further and tried to cut costs per eligible recipient. Cost
cutting can take many forms. States have limited ac-
cess to services and drugs by increasing the need for
pre-approval and by reducing optional benefits. States
have also contemplated increases in co-payments, shift-
ing more of the costs onto recipient families. In addi-
tion, states have reduced payments to service providers.
This strategy is successful in reducing costs, but may
lead more providers to refuse to serve Medicaid pa-
tients. For example, state proposals for reductions in
prescription payments have led drugstores to threaten
to stop filling Medicaid prescriptions (Associated Press,
2002). States have also turned to drug companies and
asked for larger volume discounts on Medicaid drug
purchases. Finally, states have asked the federal gov-
ernment for an increase in the matching rate. One jus-
tification for this request is that some of the increase
in Medicaid costs derives from federally legislated
increases in the eligible population.
In addition to cutting spending, states have also
drawn down their reserve fund balances. As shown in18 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
figure 7 and discussed earlier, balances were expect-
ed to fall from 10.1 percent of expenditure in 2000 to
5.9 percent by the end of fiscal 2002. As of Novem-
ber 2001, seven states indicated that they would defi-
nitely be using reserves to balance their budgets, and
17 additional states were contemplating using reserves
to balance their 2002 budgets (NCSL, 2001b).
Thus far, there has been little movement, espe-
cially among state governors, to raise taxes. In 2001,
only six states passed substantial increases in taxes.
And only in North Carolina was the increase viewed
as a response to revenue problems caused by the re-
cession (Jenny, 2002) One lesson that was reinforced
during the early 1990s recession was the political un-
popularity of raising taxes. Governors who had en-
acted significant tax increases were almost universally
voted out of office in favor of politicians promising
to lower taxes. In many cases, these changes in lead-
ership coincided with the improving economy and
new governors were able to keep their campaign
promises. A number of the governors and legislatures
that came to power in the early 1990s will soon face
a similar dilemma to that confronted by their unfor-
tunate predecessors.
So far, the limited discussion of tax increases
has revolved around the cigarette and alcohol taxes.
Oregon’s governor proposed increasing these two tax-
es in order to balance the budget. Similarly, Indiana’s
governor has proposed hiking taxes on cigarettes and
gambling. These taxes are politically the easiest to hike,
although they are not the most lucrative revenue sources.
However, for the most part, governors have chosen
to speak out vociferously against tax increases. For
example, New Jersey Governor McGreevey stated that
he was “ruling out a tax increase” as a way to solve
budget problems (Herszenhorn, 2001). This sentiment
has been echoed by numerous other governors and
legislative leaders across the country. That said, judg-
ing from the experience of the 1990s, tax hikes tend
to occur late in a decline after other, easier avenues
of budget balance have been exploited.
The debate over 2003 budgets is quite similar to the
debate over 2002 budgets. While this discussion is occur-
ring in a less panicked environment, the policy decisions
closely parallel the decisions made concerning FY2002
budgets. In particular, states are relying on spending
cuts and reserve funds rather than on tax increases.
If revenue estimates for FY2003 prove too opti-
mistic, more states will likely turn to discussion of
tax hikes. Tax increases during FY2003 may prove
particularly politically challenging. If the trend in
positive national economic news continues, state
leaders will need to justify tax increases at the same
time that voters are hearing more about the overall
health of the macroeconomy.
Actions in the midwestern states
Midwestern states were among the first hit by the
downturn. Returning to figure 9, we see that the Great
Lakes states had either the weakest or close to the
weakest tax growth in all the quarters pictured. The
midwestern (and southeastern) states had tax collec-
tions significantly below projections in 2001. Most
other states did not begin experiencing revenue prob-
lems until FY2002 (see NASBO, 2001a).
The midwestern states were among those hit ear-
liest by falling revenues. One principal reason for this
was that a downturn in manufacturing production
preceded the downturn in overall GDP growth. Fig-
ure 12 shows the trend in manufacturing relative to
the trend in GDP, while table 3 details the percentage
of state employment in manufacturing both overall
and for the midwestern states.
Illinois
As of November 2001, Illinois was facing a $500
billion deficit in the FY2002 budget. This deficit was
principally caused by lower-than-expected state reve-
nues. As of October 2001, FY2002 revenues were $262
million below the level collected over the same peri-
od the previous year. In order to confront the deficit,
the government called on state agencies to reduce their
spending by 2 percent and instituted travel restrictions,
a hiring freeze, and a one-day furlough program for
state workers. (In the end, the furlough program was pre-
vented by the state employees’ union.) The governor
also cut Medicaid payments to some hospitals, although
some of the original cuts were subsequently restored.
The 2003 budget proposed by the governor in late
February 2002 appropriated $22.7 billion from the state
general fund, representing a decline in $700 million
from the previous year’s appropriations. The proposed
budget included no tax increases, but further across
the board agency cuts of 3 percent. Additionally, the
governor proposed a cut in the state work force of 3,800
workers, principally through an early retirement pro-
gram. Furthermore, some state penal mental health
facilities were to be closed or have their opening de-
layed (State of Illinois, 2002).
Indiana
As of November, Indiana’s revenues were antici-
pated to be $540 million below the original forecast
for FY2002. By April, the state was facing a deficit
of $1.3 billion in the fiscal 2002–03 biennial budget.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The governor dealt with this shortfall by freezing a
series of state capital projects, instituting a hiring
freeze (both in September), and calling on agencies
to reduce expenditures by 7 percent. He also proposed
increases in a number of different taxes, including tax-
es on cigarettes and casinos and further cuts in agency
budgets. The legislature failed to enact tax increases
before adjourning in March, and the governor put
spending cuts directly into effect and recalled the leg-
islature for May. School funding was among the areas
cut. Indiana is the only one of the midwestern states
that is seriously considering tax increases. However,
the discussion concerning tax increases is taking part
in the context of a general tax restructuring caused
by a court-ordered change in the property tax.
Iowa
Through the end of December 2001, Iowa’s rev-
enues were $200 million below original projections.
In order to confront the resulting deficit, the governor
implemented a 4.3 percent across-the-board spending
cut. Subsequently, funding was restored for a selection
of programs, including elementary and secondary ed-
ucation. Further bad news in February was met by an
additional 1 percent cut in the 2002 budget, use of
state emergency and tobacco settlement funds, and a
furlough program for state workers.
The governor’s proposed (revised) 2003 budget
continues to avoid tax increases but proposes to bal-
ance the budget using a further 3 percent cut to agency
budgets and funds from a number of state reserves.
Education would continue to be shielded from cuts.
Included in the reserves the governor proposes to use
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is $48 million that had been slated for the state rainy
day fund and an additional $42 million from the ex-
isting rainy day fund balance. Competing budget
plans from senate Republicans (the governor is a
Democrat) propose reducing spending more dramati-
cally, including spending on education, and relying
less on emergency funds (Okamoto, 2002).
Michigan
As of November, Michigan’s general fund reve-
nues were projected to be $462 million below original
estimates and overall revenues 2.5 percent below fis-
cal 2001 collections. The state made up for this short-
fall by canceling a series of capital projects, enacting
spending cuts, and using money from outside the gen-
eral fund, including tobacco settlement money and
money from the contingency fund. Spending cuts fo-
cused on health, welfare, and corrections, but K–12
education spending was not cut. The state considered
delaying or canceling previously enacted income and
business tax cuts, but chose not to do so.
The governor’s proposed 2003 budget plans to
make up for a $1 billion shortfall using additional spend-
ing cuts, in particular a freeze in the state–local reve-
nue sharing program and significant withdrawals from
the rainy day fund and other state reserves. He does
not recommend tax increases, aside from a small in-
crease in diesel taxes. The budget shields schools
from cuts, in part by moving the timing of school tax
payments (Cain et al., 2002).
Wisconsin
Wisconsin was facing a $1.1 billion deficit in its
biennial budget covering FY2002 and FY2003. The
deficit is primarily a result of lower than anticipated
income tax collections. Because of the biennial bud-
get cycle, the state needed to confront 2002 and 2003
issues together. The governor’s proposed budget plan
includes 3.5 percent and 5 percent reductions in20 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
agency spending in 2002 and 2003, respectively,
modest cuts in university spending, and a phase out
of the provision of discretionary moneys or “shared
revenues” to local governments. Education and state
programs serving the needy were for the most part
shielded from cuts. The governor also proposes to
borrow $794 million from the state tobacco settle-
ment fund to fund the shared revenue program while
it is being phased out (McCallum, 2002).
Each of the midwestern states has chosen a dif-
ferent package of changes to address budget deficits
for the current fiscal year. These states have also be-
gun debating how to ensure that the budgets for FY2003
will be balanced. While the choices made have been
different, a general pattern emerges with the states en-
acting the least painful changes first and evolving to
harder decisions as the budget situation has continued
to deteriorate. Hiring freezes and travel restrictions
have been followed by across the board spending cuts
and a drawing down of reserve funds. States have re-
lied on reserves not only in their rainy day fund, but
also funds from the tobacco settlement, and other more
obscure places. While tax increases have largely been
avoided, if state revenues continue to disappoint, fur-
ther agency cuts may prove too painful, reserves will
be largely spent, and the states may have to resort to
tax hikes to balance their FY2003 budgets.
Conclusion: Lessons learned
After the 1991 recession, many observers hoped
that states had learned about the dangers inherent in
their budget situations and would react in subsequent
booms in ways that would prevent a recurrence of fis-
cal crisis. The current fiscal situation indicates that
many of these lessons were inadequately learned.
The biggest problem states face is the combination
of cyclical revenues with acyclical or even counter-
cyclical obligations and institutions that are not per-
mitted to use financial markets to deal with this
disjoint. States have acted in ways that exacerbate this
mismatch. For example, while the reduced sales tax
rates on food and prescription drugs are motivated by
understandable, even admirable, policy objectives,
these serve to increase the sensitivity of revenues to
the business cycle.
How can states deal with this problem?
Rainy day funds
While states’ balanced budget requirements pro-
hibit them from borrowing, they are permitted to save
money. The principal ways this is done is through
rainy day funds and cash balances in the general ac-
count. States should increase the levels of these
funds during booms to prepare for the inevitable de-
cline in revenues when the economy sours. As men-
tioned earlier, rainy day balances have been rising
over recent decades. States should continue this trend.
In fact, if states are successful in managing the
current downturn without resorting to significant tax
hikes, research may ultimately attribute this success
to the health of reserves at the start of the recession.
One issue regarding rainy day funds is that they
are perceived as funds to cover short-term adjustment
needs rather than longer-term revenue shortfalls. They
are preparing states to manage for a rainy day rather
than for the rainy season, or several seasons, that an
economic downturn represents. State leaders would
need to change their perception of these funds in order
to allow them to grow to the levels needed to main-
tain services in the face of widespread economic dif-
ficulties.
In keeping with the increased role of reserves,
state legislatures would need to increase the permit-
ted size of reserve funds. As mentioned above, many
states limit the level of reserves.
Tax cuts
The current situation, where taxes are cut during
a boom and increased during a recession, both exac-
erbates the economic cycle and means that consider-
able energy is being expended in debating changes
that are soon reversed. Given the political popularity
of tax cuts, it would be idealistic to suggest that states
should not cut taxes when the economy is booming
and instead maintain all excess funds as reserves. At
the same time, the political unpopularity of tax in-
creases means that needed tax increases occur late in
the economic cycle after considerable damage has
been done in terms of interruptions to state-provided
services. In order to deal with this problem, states
should consider enacting tax cuts that do not require
offsetting legislation to be reversed in subsequent
years. In particular, they might consider tax rebates
and refunds rather than legislated reductions in rates.
In this way, states could return money to taxpayers
without jeopardizing the finances of the government
during economic difficulties any more than is done
by the contingencies of the economic cycle itself. Many
of the tax cuts enacted during the expansion were re-
bates. More states should consider these during fu-
ture surplus years.
Expenditure patterns
One reason some observers argue against higher
reserve balances is that they believe that governments
will see these balances and find wasteful ways to spend21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
them. By returning money to taxpayers instead,
government leaders are relieved of this temptation. In
other words, these commentators believe that taxpay-
ers are better stewards of resources than legislators.
The long-term spending trends in the states justi-
fy this worry. State spending has been on an upward
trajectory relative to personal income for quite some
time. Governors and legislators should work to con-
front the spending demons by carefully reexamining
spending priorities. Spending appears only to be care-
fully controlled during fiscal crisis and not during
calmer times. States should look closely at how agen-
cies confront across-the-board spending cuts to deter-
mine where excess fat may be in the system.
Additionally, when the economy improves, the states
should continue the scrutiny of the Medicaid pro-
gram that is occurring during budget discussions.
Medicaid spending is particularly problematic be-
cause its rate of growth shows no sign of abating.
Also, major adjustments in the program are likely to
be slow to develop because they would require the
cooperation of state and federal authorities.
Additionally, states should consider public rela-
tions programs that educate the public about the valu-
able services they provide. For example, do taxpayers
know that states are the largest providers of school
funding or do they believe that this service is princi-
pally funded locally?
Leaning on the federal government
States should not expect the federal government
to bail them out when the economy sours. While the
states need to act quickly to affect budget balances dur-
ing recessions, the federal government makes policy
in a slow and considered fashion. The recent experi-
ence with Medicaid spending demonstrates the prob-
lems of relying on the federal government. While the
states have been requesting additional funds for over
six months, stimulus packages containing Medicaid
relief for states have consistently stalled in Congress.
While states may well get their additional Medicaid
support eventually, it will not come quickly enough
to ameliorate the last-minute budget crises. The prob-
lems underlying the requests for added Medicaid funds
are part of long-standing trends. The federal govern-
ment may have been more receptive to these requests
during more robust economic times.
Reversing balanced budget restrictions
One additional option for the states would be to
reverse their long-standing balanced budget restrictions
and debt limits. This would allow states to borrow
from financial markets when the economy deteriorates
and (presumably) to pay the money back as the econ-
omy improves. There are two principal arguments
against such a suggestion. First of all, such a recom-
mendation is impractical. Governors and legislators
are very proud of their balanced budgets. Even the
suggestion that these rules be reversed would be po-
litical suicide. Second, and more importantly, without
these restrictions, states would be less compelled to
make difficult spending decisions. As a result, state
spending would likely get even more out of hand.
Balanced budget restrictions mean that budgets are
balanced both from year to year and (as a result) on
average. While yearly balanced budgets are troubling
because of the business cycle, the fact that states are
not major debtors is an important strength of the state
fiscal process.
The current fiscal condition of the states and the
difficult budget negotiations states are engaged in have
come alarmingly soon after a long period of windfall
revenues. While state leaders used these revenues to
cut taxes and increase spending, they did not use them
to plan adequately for a weak economy. After two simi-
lar fiscal crises only a decade apart, one might hope
that states will understand the need to plan for future
recessions. States could better prepare for recession
by relying more completely on their reserve funds.
This would allow them to escape their historical pat-
tern of increasing taxes when citizens are poorest and
cutting services when they are most needed.22 3Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
1The majority of state budgets pertain to a fiscal year that starts
on July 1 and ends on June 30. A small number of states use a
different fiscal year. While most states operate annual budgets, 21
have biennial budget cycles. In some smaller states, this is in con-
junction with a legislature that meets every other year. In states
with biennial budgets, full-blown budgets are only authorized every
other year, but supplemental budget bills are often passed in off
years to cope with unplanned contingencies.
2States themselves rely on different fund definitions than the Cen-
sus Bureau. I use Census Bureau definitions because these guar-
antee comparability across states.
3Throughout this article, I use 1992 as a dividing point for data com-
parisons because it was the first year of positive economic growth
during the recent expansion. The last year of data used depends
on data availability. I use the most recent year for which histori-
cally comparable data is available. All real numbers are calculated
using the gross domestic product implicit price deflator from the
Executive Office of the President, Council of Economic Advisers,
2002. Average yearly growth rates are based on compounding.
4California does collect these data. Income from options and capi-
tal gains in the state grew from $25 billion in 1994 to $200 billion
in 2000 then fell to $70 billion in 2001 (Sterngold, 2002).
5Due to the particulars of the settlement, no monies were due for
1999. However, states received the 1998 funds in 1999.
6The levels of expenditure from the NASBO and Census data sets
are quite different; however, historical comparisons find that the rates
of expenditure growth tend to be very similar (Merrimam, 2000).
7Administrative costs are not included in any of these categories.
The underlying numbers include only Medicaid payments on be-
half of recipients.
8There have been numerous changes relating to the eligibility of
children since 1986. For a full discussion, see U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Ways and Means, 2002.
9Instruction represents 61.7 percent of current education expenditure,
and current expenditure represents 85 percent of total expenditure.
The 61.7 percent number is frequently cited as the percentage of
spending on teachers, but this excludes non-current spending.
10This figure actually underestimates the net effects of the decline
in state taxes because it treats each reduction as only reducing
one year’s taxes. Many reductions were permanent and therefore
reduced taxes in all subsequent years.
11This is a reasonably quick way to get an approximate calcula-
tion. One problem with this measure is that it leads to the predic-
tion that those states with the fastest growth rates of revenues from
FY1993 to FY1998 would continue to face the fastest growth rates
in the future. However, if revenues grew more quickly because
some states rely on more cyclical forms of revenue, one would
expect revenues to be slowest in those states that grew most quickly
during the expansion. A more precise estimate of necessary re-
serves would be based on the cyclicality of the specific revenue
sources relied on by each state. In a paper in 1998, Dye and McGuire
provide estimates of revenue cyclicality by state, but do not esti-
mate required reserves. The correlation between the estimates of
needed reserves and the cyclicality of revenues is –0.26. In other
words, those states that CBPP calculate as needing the most re-
serves (as a percent of their budget) to withstand a recession are
the states that Dye and McGuire find rely on least sensitive rev-
enue sources.
12For further information on the distinction between reported un-
liquidated obligations and unobligated funds, see Lazere, 2001.
13TANF will need to be reauthorized in 2002. Significant changes
are not anticipated because the program has been widely perceived
as being successful.
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